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Based on a sample of 104 countries, we document four key stylized facts regarding the 
interaction between capital flows, fiscal policy, and monetary policy.  First, net capital 
inflows are procyclical (i.e., external borrowing increases in good times and falls in bad 
times) in most OECD and developing countries.  Second, fiscal policy is procyclical (i.e., 
government spending increases in good times and falls in bad times) for the majority of 
developing countries.  Third, for emerging markets, monetary policy appears to be 
procyclical (i.e., policy rates are lowered in good times and raised in bad times).  Fourth, 
in developing countries – and particularly for emerging markets – periods of capital 
inflows are associated with expansionary macroeconomic policies and periods of capital 
outflows with contractionary macroeconomic policies. In such countries, therefore, when 
it rains, it does indeed pour.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
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 Any expert on financial crises in emerging markets could cite ample anecdotal evidence to 
support the view that macroeconomic policies are highly procyclical, at least in moments of extreme 
duress.  At the time that economic activity is contracting (often markedly) amidst a crisis, the fiscal 
authority cuts budgets deficits while the central bank raises interest rates – possibly exacerbating the 
economic contraction.  Procyclical policies, however, do not appear to be limited to crisis periods in many 
developing countries.  In fact, the roots of most of the debt crises in emerging market are all too often 
found in governments that go through bouts of high spending and borrowing when the times are favorable 
and international capital is plentiful.1 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) first called attention to the phenomenon of procyclical fiscal policy by 
showing that fiscal policy in Latin America tends to be expansionary in good times and contractionary in 
bad times. Talvi and Végh (2000) argued that, far from being a phenomenon peculiar to Latin America, 
procyclical fiscal policy seems to be the norm in the developing world just as fiscal policy is acyclical in 
the advanced economies.  Using a different econometric approach, Braun (2001) reaches a similar 
conclusion for developing countries, though he finds evidence that fiscal policy is countercyclical in 
OECD countries.  Lane (2003b) also provides evidence on the procyclicality of fiscal policy in 
developing countries compared to OECD countries.  In the same vein, Gupta et al (2004) find 
econometric support for the procyclicality of government spending in developing countries, though the 
degree of procyclicality varies across spending categories.    
Several explanations have been advanced to explain the procyclicality of fiscal policy in 
developing countries compared to industrial countries. Gavin and Perotti (1997), among others, have 
argued that developing countries face credit constraints that prevent them from borrowing in bad times.  
Hence, they are “forced” to repay in bad times, which requires a contractionary fiscal policy.  In contrast, 
Tornell and Lane (1999) develop a political-economy model in which competition for a common pool of 
funds among different units (ministries, provinces) leads to the so-called “voracity effect,” whereby 
                                                 
1 See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) for an analysis of borrowing/default cycles. 
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expenditure could actually exceed a given windfall. Taking as given such a political distortion, Talvi and 
Végh (2000) show how policymakers would find it optimal to run smaller primary surpluses in good 
times by increasing government spending and reducing tax rates.   Lastly, Riascos and Végh (2003) show 
how incomplete markets could explain procyclical fiscal policy as the outcome of a Ramsey problem 
without having to impose any additional frictions.  
In terms of monetary policy, while the impression certainly exists that developing countries often 
tighten the monetary strings in bad times (see Lane, 2003b), systematic empirical work is scant.2 This is 
probably due to the notorious difficulties (present even for advanced countries) in empirically 
characterizing the stance of monetary policy.3  
Relying on data for 104 countries for the period 1960-2003, this paper revisits the evidence on the 
procyclicality of fiscal policy and, as far as we know, presents a first systematic effort to document 
empirically the cyclical properties of monetary policy in developing countries.  It departs from earlier 
efforts investigating fiscal policy cycles in several dimensions.  First, it provides an analytical framework 
for how to interpret the behavior of a broad variety of fiscal indicators, which leads to a reinterpretation of 
some earlier results in the literature.  Second, it  analyzes countries grouped by income levels to capture 
the fact that while wealthier countries have continuous access to international capital markets, low-
income countries are almost exclusively shut out at all times, and middle-income countries have a 
precarious and volatile relationship with international capital. Third, it examines closely the interaction 
between the business cycle, international capital flows, and macroeconomic policy.4  Our premise is that 
                                                 
2 Of course if “bad times” are defined exclusively as currency or banking crises, then there is a small but growing 
theoretical literature on monetary policy in general and interest rate defenses in particular (see, for instance, Aghion, 
Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001), Flood and Jeanne (2000), and Lahiri and Végh (2003)).  The empirical evidence in 
this area is, however, rather inconclusive. 
3 For a discussion of some of the challenges in estimating monetary policy rules for industrial countries, see Clarida, 
Gali, and Gertler (1999). 
4  Throughout this paper, “business cycle” refers to the real GDP cycle. 
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the capital flow cycle is tied to the business cycle and may even influence macroeconomic policies, 
particularly in middle income countries. Fourth, it offers an eclectic approach toward defining “good” and 
“bad” times and measuring the stance of fiscal and monetary policy by employing a broad range of 
indicators.  Fifth, it disaggregates the sample along a variety of dimensions, by (i) differentiating crises 
episodes from tranquil periods, (ii) treating the more rigid exchange rate arrangements separately from the 
more flexible ones, and (iii) comparing earlier and more recent periods to assess whether the degree of 
capital market integration has altered cyclical patterns and relationships. Lastly, the analysis offers more 
comprehensive country coverage than earlier efforts. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section discusses the underlying conceptual framework 
used to interpret the data on capital flows and fiscal and monetary policy and describes the approach 
followed to define business cycles.  Section III presents a broad brush view of our main findings while 
Section IV provides greater detail on the main stylized facts by grouping countries according to income 
per capita levels, type of exchange rate arrangement, and other relevant subsamples. Section V contains 
concluding remarks.  
 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This section lays out the conceptual framework used to interpret our empirical findings in the 
following sections.  Specifically, we will discuss how to think about the cyclical properties of capital 
flows, fiscal policy, and monetary policy.  A thorough reading of the blossoming literature in the area of 
policy cyclicality in developing countries reveals a somewhat loose approach to defining basic concepts, 
which often renders the discussion rather imprecise.  For instance, countercyclical fiscal policy is often 
defined as running fiscal deficits in bad times and surpluses in good times (i.e., as a positive correlation 
between changes in output and changes in the fiscal balance).  As we will argue, however, this is an 
unfortunate way of defining the concept since running a fiscal deficit in bad times may be consistent with 
rather different approaches to fiscal stabilization.  In the same vein, considering fiscal variables as a 
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proportion of GDP – as is most often done in this literature – could yield misleading results since the 
cyclical stance of fiscal policy may be dominated by the cyclical behavior of output.  
In light of these critical conceptual issues – and at the risk of perhaps appearing sometimes 
obvious – we will be very specific as to how we define countercyclicality, procyclicality, and acyclicality.   
  
II.1 Capital flows 
 We define the cyclical properties of capital flows as follows (Table 1):  
   
Table 1 
Capital Flows: Theoretical Correlations with the Business Cycle 
   
  Net Capital Inflows Net Capital 
Inflows/GDP 
     
Countercyclical - - 
Procyclical + +/0/- 
Acyclical 0 - 
   
 
i. Capital flows into a country are said to be countercyclical when the correlation between the cyclical 
components of net capital inflows and output is negative. In other words, the economy borrows from 
abroad in bad times (i.e., capital flows in) and lends/repays in good times (i.e., capital flows out). 
ii. Capital flows are procyclical when the correlation between the cyclical components of net capital 
inflows and output is positive.  The economy thus borrows from abroad in good times (i.e., capital flows 
in) and lends/repays in bad times (i.e., capital flows out). 
iii. Capital flows are acyclical when the correlation between the cyclical components of net capital 
inflows and output is not statistically significant. The pattern of international borrowing and lending is 
thus not systematically related to the business cycle. 
While this may appear self evident, the mapping between the cyclical properties of net capital 
inflows as a share of GDP (a commonly used measure) and the business cycle is not clear cut.  As the 
third column of Table 1 indicates, in the case of countercyclical capital inflows, this ratio should also 
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have a negative correlation with output since in good (bad) times, net capital inflows fall (increase) and 
GDP increases (fall). In the case of procyclical net capital inflows, however, this ratio could have any sign 
since in good (bad) times, net capital inflows increase (fall) and GDP also increases (falls). In the 
acyclical case, the behavior of the ratio is dominated by the changes in GDP and therefore has a negative 
correlation. Thus, the ratio of net capital inflows to GDP will only provide an unambiguous indication of 
the cyclicality of net capital inflows if it has a positive sign (or is zero) in which case it would be 
indicating procylical capital flows. However, if it has a negative sign, it does not allow us to discriminate 
among the three cyclical patterns. 
Our definition of the cyclical properties of capital flows thus focuses on whether capital flows 
tend to reinforce or "stabilize" the business cycle. To fix ideas, consider the standard endowment model 
of a small open economy (with no money). In the absence of any intertemporal distortion, households 
would want to keep consumption flat over time. Thus, in response to a temporary negative endowment 
shock, the economy would borrow from abroad to sustain the permanent level of consumption. During 
good times, the economy would repay its debt. Saving is thus positively correlated with the business 
cycle. Hence, in the standard model with no investment, capital inflows would be countercyclical and 
would tend to stabilize the cycle. Naturally, the counterpart of countercyclical borrowing in the standard 
real model is a procyclical current account. 
Conversely, if the economy borrowed during good times and lent during bad times, capital flows 
would be procyclical as they would tend to reinforce the business cycle. In this case, the counterpart 
would be a countercyclical current account. Plausible theoretical explanations for procyclical capital 
flows include the following. First, suppose that physical capital is added to the basic model described 
above and that the business cycle is driven by productivity shocks. Then, a temporary and positive 
productivity shock would lead to an increase in saving (for the consumption smoothing motives described 
above) and to an increase in investment (as the return on capital has increased). If the investment effect 
dominates, then borrowing would be procyclical as the need to finance profitable investment more than 
offsets the saving effect. 
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A second explanation – particularly relevant for emerging countries – would result from 
intertemporal distortions in consumption imposed by temporary policies (like inflation stabilization 
programs or temporary liberalization policies; see Calvo, 1987, and Calvo and Végh, 1999). An 
unintended consequence of such temporary policies is to make consumption relatively cheaper during 
good times (by reducing the effective price of consumption), thus leading to a consumption boom which 
is financed by borrowing from abroad. In this case, saving falls in good times which renders capital flows 
procyclical.5 
A third possibility – also relevant for emerging countries – is that the availability of international 
capital varies with the business cycle.  If foreign investors respond to the evidence of an improving local 
economy by bidding down country risk premiums (perhaps encouraged by low interest rates at financial 
centers), residents of the small economy may view this as a temporary opportunity to finance 
consumption cheaply and, therefore, dissave.6  We should remember that the consumption booms 
financed by capital inflows in many emerging market economies in the first part of the 1990s were seen at 
the time as an example of the “capital inflow problem,” as in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993, 
1994). 
Finally, notice that, in practice, movements in international reserves could break the link between 
procyclical borrowing and current account deficits (or countercyclical borrowing and current account 
surpluses) that would arise in the basic real intertemporal model. Indeed, recall the basic balance of 
payments accounting identity:  
Change in international reserves = Current account balance + capital account balance. 
                                                 
5 Lane and Tornell (1998) offer some empirical evidence that shows that saving in Latin American countries has 
often been countercyclical (i.e., saving falls in good times and vice versa). 
6 Section IV presents evidence in support of this hypothesis.  See also Neumeyer and Perri (2004) who examine the 
importance of country risk in driving the business cycle in emerging economies.  
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Hence, say, positive net capital inflows (a capital account surplus) would not necessarily be associated 
with a negative current account balance if international reserves were increasing. Therefore, the cyclical 
properties of the current account are an imperfect indicator of those of capital flows. 
 
II.2 Fiscal policy 
Since the concept of policy cyclicality is important to the extent that it can help us understand or 
guide actual policy, it only makes sense to define policy cyclicality in terms of policy instruments, as 
opposed to outcomes (i.e., endogenous variables). Hence, we will define the cyclicality of fiscal policy in 
terms of government spending (g) and tax rates (τ) (instead of defining it in terms of, say, the fiscal 
balance or tax revenues). Given this definition, we will then examine the cyclical implications for 
important endogenous variables such as the primary fiscal balance, tax revenues, and fiscal variables as a 
proportion of GDP.  We define fiscal policy cyclicality as follows (see Table 2):  
        
Table 2 
Fiscal Indicators: Theoretical Correlations with the Business Cycle 
        
Primary    g τ Tax 
Revenues 
Primary 
Balance 
g/GDP Tax 
Revenues/GDP Balance/ 
GDP 
          
Countercyclical - + + + - +/0/- +/0/- 
Procyclical + - +/0/- +/0/- +/0/- +/0/- +/0/- 
Acyclical 0 0 + + - +/0/- +/0/- 
        
 
i. A countercyclical fiscal policy involves lower (higher) government spending and higher (lower) tax 
rates in good (bad) times. We call such a policy countercyclical because it would tend to stabilize the 
business cycle (i.e., fiscal policy is contractionary in good times and expansionary in bad times).  
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ii. A procyclical fiscal policy involves higher (lower) government spending and lower (higher) tax 
rates in good (bad) times. We call such a policy procyclical because it would tend to reinforce the 
business cycle (i.e., fiscal policy is expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times). 7 
iii. An acyclical fiscal policy involves constant government spending and constant tax rates over the 
cycle (or, more precisely for the case of a stochastic world, government spending and tax rates do not 
vary systematically with the business cycle).  We call such a policy acyclical because it neither reinforces 
nor stabilizes the business cycle. 
The correlations implied by these definitions are shown in the first two columns of Table 2. 
We next turn to the implications of these cyclical definitions of fiscal policy for the behavior of 
tax revenues, the primary fiscal balance, and government expenditure, tax revenues, and primary balance 
as a proportion of GDP.8  In doing so, we will make use of the following two definitions:  
Tax revenues = Tax rate × tax base 
Primary balance = Tax revenues - government expenditures (excluding interest payments) 
 Consider first an acyclical fiscal policy. Since the tax rate is constant over the cycle and the tax 
base increases in good times and falls in bad times, tax revenues will have a positive correlation with the 
business cycle. This, in turn, implies that the primary balance will also be positively correlated with the 
cycle. The ratio of government expenditure (net of interest payments) to GDP will be negatively 
correlated with the cycle because government expenditure does not vary and, by definition, GDP is high 
(low) in good (bad) times. Given that tax revenues are higher (lower) in good (bad) times, the correlation 
                                                 
7 It is important to notice that, under this definition, a procyclical fiscal policy implies a negative correlation 
between tax rates and output over the business cycle.  Our terminology thus differs from the one in the real business 
cycle literature in which any variable positively (negatively) correlated with the output cycle is referred to as 
procyclical (countercyclical).   
8 It is worth emphasizing that, in deriving the theoretical correlations below, the only assumption made is that the tax 
base (output or consumption) is high in good times and low in bad times. This is true by definition in the case of 
output and amply documented for the case of consumption. Aside from this basic assumption, what follows is an 
accounting exercise that is independent of any particular model. 
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of the ratio of tax revenues to GDP with the cycle is ambiguous (i.e., it could be positive, zero, or 
negative as indicated in Table 2).  As a result, the correlation of the primary balance as a proportion of 
GDP with the cycle will also be ambiguous.   
Consider procyclical fiscal policy. Since, by definition, the tax rate goes down (up) in good (bad) 
times but the tax base moves in the opposite direction, the correlation of tax revenues with the cycle is 
ambiguous. Since g goes up in good times, the correlation of g/GDP can, in principle, take on any value.  
Given the ambiguous cyclical behavior of tax revenues, the cyclical behavior of tax revenues as a 
proportion of GDP is also ambiguous.  The behavior of the primary balance as a proportion of GDP will 
also be ambiguous.  
Lastly, consider countercyclical fiscal policy.  By definition, tax rates are high in good times and 
low in bad times, which imply that tax revenues vary positively with the cycle. The same is true of the 
primary balance since tax revenues increase (fall) and government spending falls (increases) in good 
(bad) times. The ratio g/GDP will vary negatively with the cycle because g falls (increases) in good (bad) 
times.  Since tax revenues increase in good times, the behavior of tax revenues as a proportion of GDP 
will be ambiguous and, hence, so will be the behavior of the primary balance as a proportion of GDP.  
Several important observations follow from Table 2 regarding the usefulness of different 
indicators in discriminating among the three cases: 
i. From a theoretical point of view, the best indicators to look at would be government spending 
and tax rates. By definition, these indicators would clearly discriminate among the three cases. As Table 2 
makes clear, no other indicator has such discriminatory power. In practice, however, there is no 
systematic data on tax rates (other than perhaps the inflation tax rate), leaving us with government 
spending as the best indicator. 
ii. The cyclical behavior of tax revenues will be useful only to the extent that it has a negative or 
zero correlation with the business cycle. This would be an unambiguous indication that fiscal policy is 
procyclical. It would signal a case in which the degree of procyclicality is so extreme that in, say, bad 
times, the rise in tax rates is so pronounced that it either matches or dominates the fall in the tax base. 
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iii. The cyclical behavior of the primary balance will be useful only to the extent that it has a 
negative or zero correlation with the business cycle. This would be an unambiguous indication that fiscal 
policy is procyclical. It would indicate a case in which, in good times, the rise in government spending 
either matches or more than offsets a possible increase in tax revenues or a case in which a fall in tax 
revenues in good times reinforces the effect of higher government spending on the primary balance. 
Given our definition of fiscal policy cyclicality, it would be incorrect to infer that a primary deficit in bad 
times signals countercyclical fiscal policy. A primary deficit in bad times is, in principle, consistent with 
any of three cases.9   
iv. The cyclical behavior of the primary balance as a proportion of GDP will never provide an 
unambiguous reading of the cyclical stance of fiscal policy.  Interestingly, most of the literature (Gavin 
and Perotti (1997), Braun (2001), Dixon (2003), Lane (2003b), and Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2003)) has drawn conclusions from looking at this indicator.  For instance, Gavin and Perotti (1997) find 
that the response of the fiscal surplus as a proportion of GDP to a one-percentage-point increase in the 
rate of output growth is not statistically different from zero in Latin America and take this as an indication 
of procyclical fiscal policy.  Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), in contrast, find a negative effect of 
the output gap on deviations of the fiscal balance from its sample mean and interpret this as 
countercyclical fiscal policy.  Given our definitions, however, one would not be able to draw either 
conclusion (as the last column of Table 2 makes clear).     
v. The cyclical behavior of the ratio g/GDP will be useful only to the extent that it has a positive 
or zero correlation with the business cycle. This would be an unambiguous indication that fiscal policy is 
procyclical. In other words, finding that this ratio is negatively correlated with the cycle does not allow us 
                                                 
9 By the same token, it would also seem unwise to define procyclical fiscal policy as a negative correlation between 
output and the fiscal balance (as sometimes done in the literature) since a zero or even positive correlation could also 
be consistent with procyclical fiscal policy, as defined above.  
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to discriminate among the three cases.  Once again, this suggests caution in interpreting some of the 
existing literature which relies on this indicator for drawing conclusions.   
vi. Lastly, the cyclical behavior of the ratio of tax revenues to GDP will not be particularly useful 
in telling us about the cyclical properties of fiscal policy since its theoretical behavior is ambiguous in all 
three cases. 
In sum, our discussion suggests that extreme caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions 
on policy cyclicality based either on the primary balance or on the primary balance, government 
spending, and tax revenues as a proportion of GDP.  In light of this, we will only rely on indicators that, 
given our definition of procyclicality, provide an unambiguous measure of the stance of fiscal policy: 
government spending and -- as a proxy for a tax rate -- the inflation tax rate.10  
From a theoretical point of view, there are various models that could rationalize different stances 
of fiscal policy over the business cycle.  Countercyclical fiscal policy could be rationalized by resorting to 
a traditional Keynesian model (in old or new clothes) with an objective function that penalizes deviations 
of output from trend since an increase (reduction) in government spending and/or a reduction (increase) in 
tax rates would expand (contract) output.   An acyclical fiscal policy could be rationalized by neo-
classical models of optimal fiscal policy which call for roughly constant tax rates over the business cycle 
(see Chari and Kehoe (1999)).  If government spending is endogeneized (by, say, providing direct utility), 
it would optimally behave in a similar way to private consumption and hence would be acyclical in the 
presence of complete markets (Riascos and Végh (2003)).  Procyclical fiscal policy could be rationalized 
by resorting to political distortions (Tornell and Lane (1999) and Talvi and Végh (2000)), borrowing 
constraints (Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Aizeman, Gavin, and Hausmann (1996)), or incomplete markets 
(Riascos and Végh (2003)). 
                                                 
10 We are, of course, fully aware that there is certainly no consensus on whether the inflation tax should be thought 
of as “just another tax”.  While the theoretical basis for doing so goes back to  Phelps (1973) and has been greatly 
refined ever since (see, for example, Chari and Kehoe (1999)), the empirical implications of inflation as an optimal 
tax have received mixed support (see Calvo and Végh (1999) for a discussion).      
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II.3 Monetary policy 
Performing the same conceptual exercise for monetary policy is much more difficult because (i) 
monetary policy instruments may depend on the existing exchange rate regime and (ii) establishing 
outcomes (i.e., determining the behavior of endogenous variables) requires the use of some (implicit) 
model. 
For our purposes, it is enough to define two exchange rate regimes: fixed or predetermined 
exchange rates and flexible exchange rates (which we define as including any regime in which the 
exchange rate is allowed some flexibility).  By definition, flexible exchange rate regimes include 
relatively clean floats (which are rare) and dirty floats (a more common type, as documented in Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004)). 
Under certain assumptions, a common policy instrument across these two different regimes 
would be a short-term interest rate. The most prominent example is the federal funds rate in the United 
States, an overnight interbank interest rate that constitutes the Federal Reserve's main policy target. From 
a theoretical point of view, under flexible exchange rates, monetary policy can certainly be thought of in 
terms of some short-term interest rate since changes in the money supply will directly influence interest 
rates. Under fixed or predetermined exchange rates, the only assumption needed for a short-term interest 
rate to also be thought of as a policy instrument is that there be some imperfect substitution between 
domestic and foreign assets (see Flood and Jeanne (2000) and Lahiri and Végh, (2003)). In fact, it is 
common practice for central banks to raise some short-term interest rate to defend a fixed (or more rigid) 
exchange rate. 
In principle, then, observing the correlation between a policy-controlled short-term interest rate 
and the business cycle would indicate whether monetary policy is countercyclical (the interest rate is 
raised in good times and reduced in bad times, implying a positive correlation), procyclical (the interest 
rate is reduced in good times and increased in bad times, implying a negative correlation) or acyclical (the 
interest rate is not systematically used over the business cycle, implying no correlation), as indicated in 
Table 3.   
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Table 3 
Monetary Indicators: Theoretical Correlations with The Business Cycle 
     
  Short-Term 
Interest Rate 
Rate of 
Growth of 
Central Bank 
Domestic 
Credit  
Real  Money 
Balances        
(M1 and M2) 
Real Interest 
Rate 
       
Countercyclical + - +/0/- +/0/- 
Procyclical - + + - 
Acyclical 0 0 + - 
     
 
The expected correlations with other monetary variables are more complex.  In the absence of an 
active interest rate policy, we expect real money balances (in terms of any monetary aggregate) to be high 
in good times and low in bad times (i.e., positively correlated with the business cycle) and real interest 
rates to be lower in good times and high in bad times (i.e., negatively correlated with the cycle).11  A 
procyclical interest rate policy would reinforce this cyclical pattern.12  A countercyclical interest rate 
policy would in principle call for lower real money balances and higher real interest rates in good times 
relative to the benchmark of no activist policy.  In principle, this leaning-against-the wind policy could be 
so effective as to render the correlation between real money balances and output zero or even negative 
and the correlation between real interest rates and the cycle zero or even positive (as indicated in Table 3).  
In sum – and as Table 3 makes clear – the cyclical behavior of real money balances and real interest rates 
will only be informative in a subset of cases: 
                                                 
11 A negative correlation between real interest rates and output would arise in a standard endowment economy 
model (i.e., a model with exogenous output) in which high real interest rates today signal today’s scarcity of goods 
relative to tomorrow.  In a production economy driven by technology shocks, however, this relationship could have 
the opposite sign.  In addition, demand shocks, in and of themselves, would lead to higher real interest rates in good 
times and vice versa.  Given these different possibilities, any inferences drawn on the cyclical stance of monetary 
policy from the behavior of real interest rates should be treated with extreme caution.  
12 If, as part of a procyclical monetary policy, policymakers were lowering reserve requirements, this should lead to 
even higher real money balances.   
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i. A negative or zero correlation between (the cyclical components of) real money balances and 
output would indicate countercyclical monetary policy.  In this case, real money balances would fall in 
good times and rise in bad times.  In contrast, a positive correlation is, in principle, consistent with any 
monetary policy stance. 
ii. A positive or zero correlation between (the cyclical components of) the real interest rate and output 
would indicate countercyclical monetary policy.  In this case, policy countercyclicality is so extreme that 
real interest rates increase in good times and fall in bad times.  In contrast, a negative correlation is, in 
principle, consistent with any monetary policy stance. 
Unfortunately, in practice, even large databases typically carry information on overnight or very 
short-term interest rates for only a small number of countries. Hence, the interest rates that one observes 
in practice are of longer maturities and thus include an endogenous cyclical component (for instance, the 
changes in inflationary expectations, term premiums, or risk premiums over the cycle). To the extent that 
the inflation rate tends to have a small positive correlation with the business cycle in industrial countries 
and a negative correlation with the business cycle in developing countries, there will be a bias towards 
concluding that monetary policy is countercyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing 
countries. To reduce this bias, we will choose interbank/overnight rates whenever possible. 
    A second policy instrument under either regime is the rate of growth of the central bank's 
domestic credit. Naturally, how much a given change in domestic credit affects the monetary base and, 
hence, interest rates will depend on the particular exchange rate regime.  Under predetermined exchange 
rates and perfect substitution between domestic and foreign assets, the monetary approach to the balance 
of payments tells us that the change in domestic credit will be exactly undone by an opposite change in 
reserves.  However, under imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign assets, a, say, increase in 
domestic credit will have some effect on the monetary base. The same is true under a dirty floating 
regime, since the change in reserves will not fully offset the change in domestic credit. 
    In this context, a countercyclical monetary policy would imply reducing the rate of domestic 
credit growth during good times and vice versa (i.e., a negative correlation). A procyclical monetary 
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policy would imply increasing the rate of domestic credit growth during good times and vice versa (i.e., a 
positive correlation). An acyclical policy would not systematically vary the rate of growth of domestic 
credit over the business cycle.13 Of course, changes in domestic credit growth can be seen as the 
counterpart of movements in short-term interest rates, with a reduction (an increase) in domestic credit 
growth leading to an increase (reduction) in short-term interest rates. 
  In addition to computing the correlations indicated in the above table, we will attempt to establish 
whether monetary policy is procyclical, acyclical, or countercyclical by estimating Taylor rules for every 
country for which data are available (see Taylor (1993)).  Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), our 
specification takes the form: 
it = α + β1(πt – π) + β2 yct,                                                                                                                       (1) 
where it is a policy-controlled short-term interest rate, πt – π captures deviations of actual inflation from 
its sample average, π , and yct is the output gap, measured as the cyclical component of output (i.e., actual 
output minus trend) divided by actual output.  The coefficient β2 in equation (1) would indicate the stance 
of monetary policy over the business cycle (see Table 4) – over and above the monetary authority’s 
concerns about inflation which are captured by the coefficient β1.  
  
Table 4 
Taylor Rules 
  
Nature of Monetary Policy Expected Sign on β2  
    
Countercyclical + and significant 
Procyclical - and significant 
Acyclical insignificant 
  
 
                                                 
13 In practice, however, using domestic credit to measure the stance of monetary policy is greatly complicated by the 
fact that inflation (especially in developing countries) tends to be high and variable.  Hence, a large growth rate does 
not always reflect expansionary policies.  For this reason, in the empirical section we will restrict our attention to 
short-term nominal interest rates as a policy instrument.  
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Several remarks are in order regarding equation (1).   First, we are assuming that current inflation 
is a good predictor of future inflation. Second, we are assuming that the mean inflation rate is a good 
representation of some implicit/explicit inflation target on the basis that central banks deliver on average 
the inflation rate that they desire. Third, given potential endogeneity problems, the relation captured in 
equation (1) is probably best interpreted as a long-run cointegrating relationship.  Fourth, since our 
estimation will be based on annual data, equation (1) does not incorporate the possibility of gradual 
adjustments of the nominal interest rate to some target interest rate.  Fifth, by estimating equation (1) we 
certainly do not mean to imply that every country in our sample has followed some type of Taylor rule 
throughout the sample.  Rather, we see it as a potentially useful way of characterizing the correlation 
between a short-term interest rate and the output gap once one controls for the monetary authority’s 
implicit or explicit inflation target.     
 There are by now numerous studies that have estimated Taylor rules, though most are limited to 
developed countries.  For example, for the United States, Japan, and Germany, Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1997) report that, in the post-1979 period, the inflation coefficient is significantly above one (indicating 
that in response to a rise in expected inflation, central banks raised nominal rates enough to raise real 
rates) and the coefficient on the output gap is significantly positive except for the United States.  In other 
words – and using the terminology spelled out in Table 4 -- since 1979 Japan and Germany have pursued 
countercyclical monetary policy (lowering interest rates in bad times and increasing them in good times) 
but monetary policy in the United States has been acyclical.  In the pre-1979 period, however, the Federal 
Reserve also pursued countercyclical monetary policy (see Clarida, Gertler, and Gali (1999)).   For Peru, 
Moron and Castro (2000) – using the change in the monetary base as the dependent variable and adding 
an additional term involving the deviation of the real exchange rate from trend – find that monetary policy 
is countercyclical.  For Chile, Corbo (2000) finds that monetary policy does not respond to output (i.e., is 
acyclical).  
 In terms of the theoretical literature, there has been extensive work on how to theoretically derive 
Taylor-type rules in the context of Keynesian models (see, for example, Clarida, Gertler, and Gali 
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(1999)).  This literature would rationalize countercyclical monetary policy on the basis that increases 
(decreases) in the output gap (i.e., actual minus trend output) call for higher (lower) short-term interest 
rates to reduce (boost) aggregate demand.   Acyclical monetary policy could be rationalized in terms of 
neo-classical models of optimal monetary policy which call for keeping the nominal interest rate close to 
zero (see Chari and Kehoe (1999)).  Collection costs for conventional taxes could optimally explain a 
positive – but still constant over the cycle – level of nominal interest rates (see Calvo and Végh (1999) 
and the references therein).  Some of the stories put forward to explain procyclical fiscal policy 
mentioned above could also be used to explain procyclical monetary policy if the nominal interest rate is 
part of the policy set available to the Ramsey planner.  Non-fiscal based explanations for procyclical 
monetary policy might include the need for defending the domestic currency under flexible exchange 
rates (Lahiri and Végh (2004)) –which in bad times would call for higher interest rates to prevent the 
domestic currency from depreciating further – and models in which higher interest rates may provide a 
signal of the policymaker’s intentions (see Drazen (2000)).  In these models, establishing “credibility” in 
bad times may call for higher interest rates. 
 
II.4 Measuring “good” and “bad” times 
Not all advanced economies have as clearly defined business cycle turning points as those 
established by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) for the United States.  For developing 
economies, where quarterly data for the national income accounts is at best recent and most often 
nonexistent, even less is known about economic fluctuations and points of inflexion. Thus, to pursue our 
goal of assessing the cyclical stance of capital flows and macroeconomic policies, we must develop some 
criterion that breaks down economic conditions into “good” and “bad” times. Taking an eclectic approach 
to sort out this issue, we will follow three different techniques: a non-parametric approach and two 
filtering techniques commonly used in the literature.  
  
 18
The non-parametric approach consists in dividing the sample into episodes where annual real 
GDP growth is above the median (“good times”) and those times where growth falls below the median 
(“bad times”).  The relevant median or cutoff point is calculated on a country-by-country basis. We then 
compute the “amplitude” of the cycle in different variables by comparing the behavior of the variable in 
question in good and bad times.  We should notice that, although growth below the median need not 
signal a recession, restricting the definition of recession to involve only periods where GDP growth is 
negative is too narrow a definition of bad times for countries which have rapid population growth (which 
encompasses the majority of our sample), rapid productivity growth, or countries that have seldom 
experienced a recession by NBER standards.  This approach has the appeal that it is nonparametric and 
free from the usual estimation problems that arise when all the variables in question are potentially 
endogenous.   
The other two approaches consist of decomposing each time series into its stochastic trend and 
cyclical component using two popular filters—the ubiquitous Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP) and the band-
pass filter developed in Baxter and King (1999).  After decomposing each series into its trend and cyclical 
component, we report a variety of pairwise correlations between the cyclical components of GDP, net 
capital inflows, and fiscal and monetary indicators for each of the four income groups.  These correlations 
are used to establish contemporaneous comovements, but a fruitful area for future research would be to 
analyze potential temporal causal patterns. 
 
III.  THE BIG PICTURE 
This section presents a visual overview of the main stylized facts that we have uncovered, leaving the 
more detailed analysis of the results for the following sections.14  Our aim here is to contrast OECD and 
developing (i.e., non-OECD) countries and synthesize our findings in terms of key stylized facts.  It is 
                                                 
14  Our data set covers 104 countries for the period 1960-2003 (the starting date for each series varies across 
countries and indicators).  See Appendix Table 1 for data sources and Appendix Table 2 for the list of countries.   
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worth stressing that we are not trying to identify underlying “structural” parameters or “shocks” that may 
give rise to these empirical regularities, but merely trying to uncover “reduced-form” correlations hidden 
in the data.  Our findings can be summarized in terms of four stylized facts.  
Stylized fact # 1.  Net capital inflows are procyclical in most OECD and developing countries. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the correlation between the cyclical components of net capital 
inflows and GDP.  As the plot makes clear, most countries exhibit a positive correlation, indicating that 
countries tend to borrow in good times and repay in bad times.  
 Stylized fact # 2.  With regard to fiscal policy, OECD countries are, by and large, either countercyclical 
or acyclical.  In sharp contrast, developing countries are predominantly procyclical.   
Figures 2 through 4 illustrate this critical difference in fiscal policy between advanced and developing 
economies.  Figure 2 plots the correlation between the cyclical components of real GDP and real 
government spending.  As is clear from the graph, most OECD countries have a negative correlation 
while most developing countries have a positive correlation.  Figure 3 plots the difference between the 
percent change in real government spending when GDP growth is above the median (good times) and 
when it is below the median (bad times). This provides a measure of the amplitude of the fiscal policy 
cycle: large negative numbers suggest that the growth in real government spending is markedly higher in 
bad times (and thus policy is strongly countercyclical), while large positive numbers indicate that the 
growth in real government spending is markedly lower in bad times (and thus policy is strongly 
procyclical).   In our sample, the most extreme case of procyclicality is given by Liberia, where the 
growth in real government spending is 32.4 percentage points higher in good times compared to bad 
times, whereas the most extreme cases of countercyclicality are Sudan and Denmark, where real 
government spending growth is over 7 percentage points lower during expansions.  Furthermore, in 
addition to a more volatile cycle – and as Aguiar and Gopinath (2004) show for some of the larger 
emerging markets – the trend component of output is itself highly volatile, which would also be captured 
in this measure of amplitude. Finally, Figure 4 plots the correlation between the cyclical components of 
output and the inflation tax.  A negative correlation indicates procyclical fiscal policy since it implies that 
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the inflation tax rate is lower in good times.  Figure 4 makes clear that most OECD countries exhibit a 
positive correlation (countercyclical policy) while most developing countries exhibit a negative 
correlation (procyclical policy).   
Stylized fact # 3.  With regard to monetary policy, most OECD countries are countercyclical, while 
developing countries are mostly procyclical or acyclical.  
This is illustrated in Figure 5 for nominal lending rates.  This holds for other nominal interest rates 
(including various measures of policy rates), as described in the next section.  We plot the lending rate 
because it is highly correlated with the policy rates but offers more comprehensive data coverage. 
Stylized fact # 4.  In developing countries, the capital flow cycle and the macroeconomic policy cycle 
reinforce each other (we dub this positive relationship as the “when it rains, it pours” phenomenon).  
Put differently, macroeconomic policies are expansionary when capital is flowing in and contractionary 
when capital is flowing out. This is illustrated in Figures 6 through 8.  Figure 6 shows that most 
developing countries exhibit a positive correlation between the cyclical components of government 
spending and net capital inflows, but there does not seem to be an overall pattern for OECD countries.  In 
the same vein, Figure 7 shows that in developing countries the correlation between the cyclical 
components of net capital inflows and the inflation tax is mostly negative while no pattern is apparent for 
OECD countries.  Lastly, Figure 8 shows a predominance of negative correlations between the cyclical 
components of net capital inflows and the nominal lending rate for developing countries, suggesting that 
the capital flow and the monetary policy cycle reinforce each other.  The opposite appears to be true for 
OECD countries.    
 
IV. FURTHER EVIDENCE ON BUSINESS, CAPITAL FLOWS, AND POLICY CYCLES 
 
This section examines in greater depth the four stylized facts presented in the preceding section  
by looking at alternative definitions of monetary and fiscal policy, using different methods to define the 
cyclical patterns in economic activity, international capital flows, and macroeconomic policies, and 
splitting the sample along several dimensions.  In particular – and as discussed in Section II above – we 
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will use three different approaches to define good and bad times: a non-parametric approach that allows 
us to quantify the amplitude of the cycles and two more standard filtering techniques: the Hodrick-
Prescott filter and the band-pass filter.  
 
IV. 1 Capital flows  
Tables 5 through 7 present additional evidence on stylized fact # 1 (i.e., net capital inflows are 
procyclical in most OECD and developing countries).   
    
Table 5 
Amplitude of the Capital Flow Cycle 
    
  Net Capital Inflows/GDP 
Good Times Bad Times Amplitude Countries 
(1) (2) (1)-(2) 
OECD 0.5 0.4 0.1 
Middle-High Income 4.4 3.0 1.4 
Middle-Low Income 4.2 3.0 1.2 
Low Income 3.9 3.6 0.3 
    
Notes: Capital inflows/GDP is expressed in percentage terms. 
Good (bad) times are defined as those years in which GDP growth is above (below) the median. 
Source: IMF,  World Economic Outlook. 
    
 
Table 5 shows that net capital inflows as a proportion of GDP tend to be larger in good times than 
in bad times for all groups of countries, which indicates procyclical net capital inflows (recall from Table 
1 that a positive correlation between capital inflows as a proportion of GDP and real GDP implies 
procyclical net capital inflows). 15 16  The decline in capital inflows as a proportion of GDP in bad times is 
largest for the middle-high income economies (1.4 percent of GDP).  This should come as no surprise 
                                                 
15Based on data for 33 poor countries over a 25 year period, Pallage and Robe (2001) conclude that foreign aid has 
also been procyclical, which is consistent with our overall message.   
16 We also found that, for both groups of middle-income countries, the current account deficit is larger in good times 
than in bad times, which is consistent with procyclical capital flows. 
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since this group of countries is noted for having on-and-off access to international private capital markets, 
partly due to a history of serial default.17  
The behavior of international credit ratings, such as the Institutional Investor Index, also provides 
insights on capital market access.18  As discussed in Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), at very low 
ratings (the low-income countries), the probability of default is sufficiently high that countries are entirely 
shut out of international private capital markets, while ratings at the high end of the spectrum are a sign of 
uninterrupted market access.  These observations are borne out in Tables 6 and 7.  Table 6 shows that 
there is essentially no difference in credit ratings during good and bad times for the wealthy OECD 
economies and the low-income countries.  The largest difference in ratings across good and bad times is 
for the middle-income countries, where ratings are procyclical (i.e., high in good times and low in bad 
times).    
    
Table 6 
International Credit Ratings 
    
  Institutional Investor Ratings 
Good Times Bad Times Amplitude   Countries 
(1) (2) (1)-(2) 
OECD 78.5 78.4 0.1 
Middle-High Income 42.2 40.4 1.8 
Middle-Low Income 32.9 30.8 2.1 
Low Income 24.2 24.2 0.0 
    
Good (bad) times are defined as those years in which GDP growth is above (below) the 
median. 
Sources: Institutional Investor and  IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
    
 
                                                 
17 See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003).  
 
18 The Institutional Investor ratings, which are compiled twice a year, are based on information provided by 
economists and sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks and securities firms. The ratings grade each country 
on a scale going from zero to 100, with a rating of 100 given to countries which are perceived as having the lowest 
chance of defaulting on its government debt obligations.    
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This “U-shaped” pattern is also evident in the volatility of the credit ratings.  Table 7 presents 
basic descriptive statistics for growth and the Institutional Investor ratings.  Not surprisingly, ratings are 
far more stable for OECD economies (the coefficient of variation is 0.06) but so is growth, with a 
coefficient of variation of 0.8.  Despite the fact that output is the most volatile for the group of low 
income economies (with a coefficient of variation of 1.6, or twice the level of the OECD group), its 
international ratings (0.18) are more stable than those of middle income countries (0.22 and 0.23).  
     
Table 7 
International Credit  Ratings and Real GDP: Descriptive Statistics 
     
Countries  
OECD Middle-High Middle-Low Low 
                        
Statistics 
  Income Income Income 
Institutional Investor Index: 1979-2003 
Coefficient of variation  0.06 0.22 0.23 0.18 
Mean 79.9 41.5 32.0 21.8 
Real GDP Growth:  1960-2003 
Coefficient of variation  0.80 1.20 1.20 1.60 
Mean 3.90 4.90 4.70 3.30 
     
Sources: Institutional Investor and IMF, World Economic Outlook.   
     
 
Finally, Table 8 presents correlations (using our two different filters) between the cyclical 
components of real GDP and net capital inflows.19  The correlations are positive and significant for all 
four groups of countries and for both filters.  Not surprisingly, the correlations are the highest for OECD 
and middle-high income countries and the lowest for low income countries. These results thus strongly 
support the idea that capital inflows are indeed procyclical for both industrial and developing countries.    
 
   
                                                 
19 Tables 8, 10, 12, and 14 report the average country correlation for the indicated group of countries.  We use a 
standard t-test to ascertain where the average is significantly different from zero.  
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Table 8 
Correlations between the Cyclical Components 
of Net Capital Inflows and Real GDP 
   
Countries Correlations  
  HP Filter Band-Pass Filter 
     
OECD 0.30* 0.25* 
Middle-High Income 0.35* 0.26* 
Middle-Low Income 0.24* 0.20* 
Low Income 0.16* 0.10* 
   
Note: An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level. 
Sources:  IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic   
Outlook. 
   
 
IV.2 Fiscal policy 
  With regard to Stylized fact # 2 (i.e., fiscal policy in OECD countries is, by and large, either 
countercyclical or acyclical while in developing countries fiscal policy is predominantly procyclical), 
Table 9 provides a measure of the amplitude of the fiscal policy cycle by showing – for six different 
measures of government spending – the difference between the change in real government spending when 
GDP growth is above the median and when it is below the median. Under this definition, a positive 
amplitude indicates procyclical government spending.  The inflation tax is also included as the remaining 
fiscal indicator, with a negative amplitude denoting a procyclical tax rate. As argued in section 2, 
government spending and the inflation tax rate provide the best indicators to look at in terms of their 
ability to discriminate among different cyclical policy stances (recall Table 3).  Other indicators – such as 
fiscal balances or tax revenues – convey less information.  
The striking aspect of Table 9 is that, as shown in the last column, the amplitude of the fiscal 
spending cycle for non-OECD countries is considerably large for all measures of government spending.  
This suggests that, in particular for the two middle income groups, fiscal policy is not only procyclical,  
but markedly so. In contrast, while positive, the analogous figures for OECD countries are quite small, 
suggesting, on average, an acyclical fiscal policy.   
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Furthermore, based on the country-by-country computations of the amplitude of the fiscal 
spending cycle underlying Table 9 (which are illustrated in Figure 3), the conclusion that non-OECD 
countries are predominantly procyclical is overwhelming. For instance, for real central government 
expenditure, 94 percent of low-income countries exhibit a positive amplitude.  For middle-low income 
countries this figure is 91 percent.  Remarkably, every single country in the middle-high income category 
registers as procyclical.  In contrast, when it comes to OECD countries, there is an even split between 
procyclical and countercyclical countries.   
Turning to the inflation tax rate, π/(1+π), it registers as procyclical in all of the four groups.  The 
amplitude is the largest for the low income group (3 percentage points and the smallest for OECD 
countries (0.9 percentage point).20  Not surprisingly, the increase in the inflation tax rate is the highest 
during recessions (13.1 percent) for the middle-high income countries (which include chronic high 
inflation countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) and lowest for the OECD at 5.4 percent. 
Table 10 presents the pairwise correlations for the expenditure measures shown in Table 9 as well 
as for the inflation tax rate.  With regard to the correlations between the cyclical components of GDP and 
government expenditure, the most salient feature of the results presented in Table 10 is that for the three 
developing country groups, all of the 36 correlations reported in Table 10 (18 correlations per filter) are 
positive irrespective of the expenditure series used or the type of filter.  By contrast, all of the 12 
correlations reported for the OECD are negative (though low).  This is not to say that the relationship 
between the fiscal expenditure and business cycle is an extremely tight one (several entries in Table 10 
show low correlations that are not significantly differently from zero—consistent with an acyclical pattern 
as defined in Table 2).  However, when one examines these results, it becomes evident that for non-
OECD countries (at least according to this exercise), fiscal policy is squarely procyclical.21   
                                                 
20 Figures on the inflation tax are multiplied by one hundred.  
21 In terms of the country-by-country computations underlying Table 10, it is worth noting that for, say, real central 
government expenditure, 91 percent of the correlations for developing countries are positive (indicating procyclical 
(continued) 
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In terms of the inflation tax, the results for both filters coincide: the correlation between the 
cyclical components of GDP and the inflation tax is positive and significant for OECD countries 
(indicating countercyclical fiscal policy) and negative and significant for all groups of developing 
countries (indicating procyclical fiscal policy).  
Table 10 also presents evidence on the relationship between capital inflows and fiscal policy.  
Our premise is that the capital flow cycle may affect macroeconomic policies in developing countries, 
particularly in the highly volatile economies that comprise the middle-high income countries. To this end, 
we report the correlations (using both the HP and bandpass filters) of the cyclical components of the fiscal 
variables and net capital inflows.  Remarkably, all but one of the 36 correlations (18 per filter) for non-
OECD countries are positive with 21 of them being significantly different from zero.  This provides clear 
support for the idea that the fiscal spending cycle is positively linked to the capital flow cycle (Stylized 
fact #4.)  The evidence is particularly strong for middle-high income countries (with 10 out of the 12 
positive correlations being significant).  We do not pretend, of course, to draw inferences on causality 
from pairwise correlations, but it is not unreasonable to expect that a plausible causal relationship may 
run from capital flows to fiscal spending—an issue that clearly warrants further study.  More surprising is 
the evidence suggesting that the relationship between the fiscal spending cycle and capital flows is also 
important for low income countries (most of which have little access to international capital markets). It 
may be fruitful to explore to what extent this result may owe to links between cycles in commodity prices 
and government expenditure.22  In sharp contrast to developing countries, the correlations for OECD 
countries are – with only one exception – never significantly different from zero, which suggests that 
there is no link between the capital flow cycle and fiscal spending.  
                                                                                                                                                             
fiscal policy) whereas 65 percent of the correlations for OECD countries are negative (indicating countercyclical 
fiscal policy), as illustrated in Figure 2.   
 
22 In this regard, see Cuddington (1989). 
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Table 10 also indicates that the inflation tax is significantly and negatively correlated with the 
capital flow cycle for all developing countries (and both filters).  Our conjecture is that inflation provides 
a form of alternative financing when international capital market conditions deteriorate.  For OECD 
countries, this correlation is not significantly different from zero.  
 
IV.3. Monetary policy  
 To document Stylized fact # 3 (i.e., monetary policy is countercyclical in most OECD countries 
while it is mostly procyclical in developing ones), we perform the same kind of exercises carried out for 
the fiscal indicators but, in addition, we also estimate variants of the Taylor rule, as described in Section 
II.   
Table 11 presents the same exercise performed in Table 9 for the five nominal interest rate series 
used in this study. As discussed in Section II, a short-term policy instrument, such as the interbank rate 
(or in some countries the T-bill or discount rate), is the best indicator of the stance of monetary policy.  In 
this case, a negative amplitude denotes procyclical monetary policy. The difference between the OECD 
countries and the other groups is striking.  For the OECD countries, interest rates decline in recessions 
and increase in expansions (for example, the interbank interest rate falls on average 0.7 percent or 70 
basis points during recessions).  In sharp contrast, in non-OECD countries, most of the nominal interest 
rates decline in expansions and increase in recessions (for instance, interbank rates in middle high income 
countries rise by 2.3 percent or 230 basis points in recessions).  Thus the pattern for the non-OECD group 
is broadly indicative of procyclical monetary policy.23  
                                                 
23Appendix Tables 3 and 4 show results analogous to those in Table 11 for real interest rates and real monetary 
aggregates, respectively. Broadly speaking, real rates for OECD countries show a positive correlation with the cycle 
(i.e., they generally rise in good times and fall in bad times).  This is, in principle, consistent with countercyclical 
monetary policy (recall Table 3).  In contrast, for middle high and middle low income countries, real interest rates 
appear to be negatively correlated with the cycle.  These results are consistent with those reported in Neumeyer and 
Perri (2004).  The results for low income countries are harder to interpret as they are more similar to those for 
OECD countries.  The results for real money balances in Appendix Table 4 are in line with our priors – with real 
money balances rising more in good times than in bad times.  This positive correlation, however, does not allow us 
to draw any inference on the stance of monetary policy (recall Table 3).  
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Table 12 presents the correlations of the cyclical components of real GDP, capital inflows, and 
the five nominal interest rates introduced in the previous table.  In terms of the cyclical stance of 
monetary policy, the evidence seems the most compelling for OECD countries (countercyclical monetary 
policy), where all 10 correlations are positive and seven significantly so. There is also evidence to suggest 
procyclical monetary policy in middle-high income countries (all ten correlations are negative and four 
significantly so).  The evidence is more mixed for the other two groups of countries where the lack of 
statistical significance partly reflects the fact that they have relative shorter time series on interest rates.24    
Turning to the correlations between net capital inflows and interest rates in Table 12, the evidence 
is again strongest for the OECD countries (with all 10 correlations significantly positive), clearly 
indicating that higher interest rates are associated with capital inflows.  For middle-high income countries, 
8 out of the 10 correlations are negative but not significantly different from zero (again, shorter time 
series are an important drawback).  Still, we take this as suggestive evidence of the when-it–rains-it-pours 
syndrome. 
 Given the notorious difficulties (present even for advanced countries such as the United States) in 
empirically characterizing the stance of monetary policy, we performed a complementary exercise as a 
robustness check for all income groups.  Specifically, we estimated the Taylor rule specified in Section II.  
Table 13 reports the results for the three nominal interest rates that are, at least in principle, more likely to 
serve as policy instruments (interbank, T-bill, and discount.)  Recalling that countercyclical policy 
requires a positive and significant β2, the main results are as follows.25  First, monetary policy in OECD 
countries appears to be countercyclical (as captured by positive and significant coefficients in two out of 
the three specifications).  Second, there is some evidence of monetary policy procyclicality in middle-
                                                 
24 It is important to warn the reader that the data on interest rates for non-OECD countries is spotty and rather 
incomplete.  Our results should thus be interpreted with caution and as merely suggestive.    
25 As an aside, notice that the coefficient on the inflation gap is always positive and significant. 
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income countries (as captured by the negative and significant coefficients for the T-bill regressions).  This 
overall message is thus broadly consistent with that of Tables 11 and 12.   
 
IV.4  Exchange rate arrangements, capital market integration, and crises 
In the remainder of this section, we divide the sample along three different dimensions in order to 
assess whether our results are affected by the degree of capital mobility in the world economy,  the 
existing exchange rate regime, and the presence of crises.  First, to examine whether the increased capital 
account integration of the more recent past has affected the cyclical patterns of the variables of interest, 
we split our sample into two subperiods (1960-1979 and 1980-2003) and performed all the exercises 
described earlier in this section.  Second, we break up the sample according to a rough measure of the de 
facto degree of exchange rate flexibility.  Lastly, we split the sample into currency crisis periods and 
tranquil periods.  This enables us to ascertain whether our results on procyclicality are driven to some 
extent by the more extreme crises episodes. The results for each of these partitions – which are presented 
in Table 14 -- will be discussed in turn.26    
 
a. 1960-1979 versus 1980-2003 
The four main results that emerge from dividing the sample into 1960-1979 and 1980-2003 are 
the following.  First, capital flows are consistently procyclical in both periods, with the correlation 
increasing in the latter period for middle-high income countries. Second, the cyclical stance of 
government spending does not appear to change across periods for non-OECD countries (i.e., fiscal 
policy is procyclical in both periods) but OECD countries appear to have been acyclical in the pre-1980 
period and turn countercyclical in the post-1980 period. Third, the inflation tax appears to be essentially 
acyclical in the pre-1980 period only to turn significantly countercyclical for OECD countries and 
                                                 
26 To conserve on space, Table 14 presents results for only one measure of government spending and one interest 
rate using the HP filter.  The remaining results are available upon request from the authors. 
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procyclical for the rest of the groups in the post-1980 period. Fourth, monetary policy seems to have 
switched from acyclical to countercyclical for OECD countries.  Lack of data for developing countries 
precludes a comparison with the earlier period.    
 
b. Fixed versus flexible exchange rates 
Our second partition assesses whether the cyclical patterns in net capital inflows and 
macroeconomic policies differ across exchange rate regimes (broadly defined).  To this effect, we split 
the sample into three groups (a coarser version of the five-way de facto classification in Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2004).  The fixed exchange rate group comprises the exchange rate regimes labeled 1 and 2 (pegs 
and crawling pegs) in the five-way classification just mentioned. The flexible exchange rate group 
comprises categories 3 (managed floating) and 4 (freely floating).  Those labeled “freely falling” by the 
Reinhart and Rogoff classification (category 5) were excluded from the analysis altogether. 
The main results to come out of this exercise are as follows.  First, there are no discernible differences 
in the correlations between net capital inflows and real GDP cycles across the two groups.  Second, no 
differences are detected either for government spending.  Third, the inflation tax appears to be more 
countercyclical for OECD countries and more procyclical for non-OECD countries in flexible regimes.  
Lastly, monetary policy is more countercyclical for the OECD group under flexible rates.   
 
c.   Crisis versus tranquil periods 
We define currency crashes as referring to a 25 percent or higher monthly depreciation that is at least 10 
percent higher than the previous month’s depreciation. Those years (as well as the two years following 
the crisis) are treated separately from tranquil periods.  The idea is to check whether our main results are 
driven by the presence of crises.  Table 14 suggests that this is definitely not the case. Indeed, our results 
appear to hold also as strongly – if not more -- in tranquil times.  We thus conclude that the paper’s 
message does not depend on our having crises periods in our sample.  
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V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We have studied the cyclical properties of capital flows and fiscal and monetary policies for 104 
countries for the period 1960-2003.  Much more analysis needs to be undertaken to refine our 
understanding of the links between the business cycle, capital flows, and macroeconomic policies, 
particularly across such a heterogeneous group of countries and circumstances (and especially in light of 
endemic data limitations). With these considerations in mind, our main findings can be summarized as 
follows: 
i) Net capital inflows are procyclical in most OECD and developing countries.  
ii) Fiscal policy is procyclical for most developing countries and markedly so in middle-high 
income countries. 
iii)  Though highly preliminary, we find some evidence of monetary policy procyclicality in 
developing countries, particularly for the middle-high income countries.  There is also some 
evidence of countercyclical monetary policy for the OECD countries.  
iv) For developing countries – and particularly for middle high income countries -- the capital 
flow cycle and the macroeconomic cycle reinforce each other (the when-it-rains-it pours 
syndrome).   
From a policy point of view, the implications of our findings appear to be of great practical 
importance.  While macroeconomic policies in OECD countries seem to be mostly aimed at stabilizing 
the business cycle (or, at the very least, remaining neutral), macroeconomic policies in developing 
countries seem to mostly reinforce the business cycle, turning sunny days into scorching infernos and 
rainy days into torrential downpours.  While there may be a variety of frictions explaining this 
phenomenon (for instance, political distortions, weak institutions, and capital market imperfections), the 
inescapable conclusion is that developing countries – and in particular emerging countries – need to find 
mechanisms that would enable macro-policies to be conducted in a neutral or stabilizing way.  In fact, 
there is some evidence to suggest that emerging countries with a reputation of highly-skilled 
policymaking (the case of Chile immediately comes to mind) have been able to “graduate” from the 
  
 32
procyclical gang and conduct neutral/countercyclical fiscal policies (see Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2003)).  In the particular case of Chile, the adoption of fiscal rules specifically designed to encourage 
public saving in good times may have helped in this endeavor.   
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that our empirical objective has consisted in computing “reduced-
form” correlations (in the spirit of the real business cycle literature) and not in identifying policy rules or 
structural parameters.  The types of friction that one would need to introduce into general equilibrium 
models in order to explain the when-it-rains-it-pours syndrome identified in this paper should be the 
subject of further research.  In sum, we hope that the empirical regularities identified in this paper will 
stimulate theoreticians to reconsider existing models that may be at odds with the facts and empiricists to 
revisit the data with more refined techniques.   
 
 
  
 33
REFERENCES 
 
Aghion, Phillipe, Philippe Bacchetta and Abhijit Banerjee, “Currency Crises and Monetary Policy in an 
Economy with Credit Constraints,” European Economic Review, Vol. 45 (2001), pp. 1121-1150.  
 
Aizenman, Joshua, Michael Gavin, and Ricardo Hausmann, "Optimal Tax Policy with Endogenous 
Borrowing Constraints," NBER Working Paper No. 5558 (1996). 
 
Aguiar, Mark, and Gita Gopinath, “Emerging Market Business Cycles: The Cycle is the Trend,” mimeo 
(University of Chicago, 2004).  
 
Baxter, Marianne, and Robert G. King. “Measuring Business Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass Filters for 
Economic Time Series.” Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (1999): 575–93.  
 
Braun, Miguel, “Why Is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in Developing Countries” (mimeo, Harvard University, 
2001). 
 
Calderon, Cesar and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, “Macroeconomic Policies and Performance in Latin 
America,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 22 (2003), pp. 895-923. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo A. "On the Costs of Temporary Policy," Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 27 
(1987), pp. 245-262.  
 
Calvo, Guillermo A., Leonardo Leiderman, and Carmen M. Reinhart, “Capital Inflows and Real 
Exchange Rate Appreciation in Latin America: The Role of External Factors,” IMF Staff Papers, 
Vol. 40 (1993), pp. 108-151.  
 
Calvo, Guillermo A., Leonardo Leiderman, and Carmen M. Reinhart, “The Capital Inflows Problem: 
Concepts and Issues,” Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. XII (1994), pp. 54-66. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Carlos A. Végh, "Inflation Stabilization and BOP Crises in Developing 
Countries"  in John Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics (Volume 
C; North Holland, 1999), pp. 1531-1614. 
 
Chari, V.V. and Patrick Kehoe, “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy,” NBER Working Papers No. 6891 
(1999).  
 
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler, “Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International 
Evidence,” NBER Working Paper No. 6254 (1997).  
 
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler, “The Science of Monetary Policy; A New Keynesian 
Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37 (1999), pp. 1161-1707.   
 
Corbo, Vittorio, “Monetary Policy in Latin America in the 90s,” Central Bank of Chile Working Paper 
No. 78 (2000). 
 
Cuddington, John, “Commodity Export Booms in Developing Countries” The World Bank Research 
Observer, Vol. 4, No. 2,  July 1989, 143-165. 
 
Dixon, Jay, “Voracity, Volatility, and Growth” (mimeo, UCLA, 2003).  
  
 34
 
 
Drazen, Alan, “Interest Rate and Borrowing Defense Against Speculative Attack,” Carnegie-Rochester 
Series on Public Policy, Vol. 53 (2000).  
 
Flood, Robert P. and Olivier Jeanne, “An Interest Rate Defense of a Fixed Exchange Rate?” IMF 
Working Paper No. 00/159 (2000).  
 
Gavin, Michael, and Roberto Perotti, “Fiscal Policy in Latin America,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 11-61. 
 
Gupta, Sanjeev, Benedict Clements, Bernardin Akitoby, and Gabriela Inchauste, “The Cyclicality of 
Government Spending in Developing Countries” (mimeo, IMF, 2004).   
 
Lahiri, Amartya and Carlos A. Végh, “Delaying the Inevitable: Interest Rate Defense and BOP Crises," 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 111 (2003), pp. 404-424.  
 
Lahiri, Amartya and Carlos A. Végh, “On the Non-Monotonic Relation between Interest Rates and the 
Exchange Rate,” mimeo (New York Fed and UCLA, 2004).  
 
Lane, Philip, “The Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD” Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 87 (2003a), pp. 2661-2675. 
 
Lane, Philip, “Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Policy in Emerging Market Economies” (mimeo, 
Trinity College, Dublin, 2003b).   
 
Lane, Philip and Aaron Tornell, “Why Aren’t Latin American Savings Rates Procyclical? Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 57 (1998), pp. 185-200. 
 
Moron, Eduardo and Juan Francisco Castro, 2000, “Uncovering Central Bank’s Monetary Policy 
Objective: Going Beyond the Fear of Floating,” (mimeo, Universidad del Pacifico).  
 
Neumeyer, Pablo A., and Fabrizio Perri, “Business Cycles in Emerging Economies: The Role of Interest 
Rates,” NBER Working Paper No. 10837 (2004).  
 
Pallage, Stephane, and Michel A. Robe, “Foreign Aid and the Business Cycle,” Review of International 
Economics, Vol. 9 (2001), pp. 637-668.  
 
Phelps, Edmund (1973), “Inflation in the Theory of Public Finance,” Swedish Journal of Economics, Vol. 
(75), pp. 67-82. 
 
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff. “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A 
Reinterpretation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXIX No. 1, February 2004, 1-48 
 
Reinhart, Carmen M., Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano. “Debt Intolerance,” in William 
Brainard and George Perry, eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.1 Spring 2003, 1-
74. 
 
Riascos, Alvaro and Carlos A. Végh, “Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries: The Role of 
Incomplete Markets” (mimeo, UCLA and Banco Republica, Colombia, 2003).   
 
  
 35
Talvi, Ernesto, and Carlos A. Végh, “Tax Base Variability and Procyclical Fiscal Policy,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 7499 (2000), forthcoming Journal of Development Economics.   
 
Taylor, John, “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy, Vol. 39 (1993), pp. 195-214.  
 
Tornell, Aaron and Philip Lane, "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, Vol. 89 (1999), pp. 
22-46. 
 
World Bank, various issues. Global Development Finance.  (Washington DC: The World Bank). 
  
 36
 
APPENDIX.  INDEX OF CYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICY 
 This paper has explored the cyclical properties of a variety of fiscal policy indicators.  We now 
construct a summary measure of the cyclical properties of fiscal policy.  This composite index could be 
used to rank individual countries in terms of their fiscal policy stance and, in future empirical work, to 
explain this cross-country variation using a variety of economic, political, and institutional variables.  
While the selection of both the components of the composite index and the weights attached to them is 
necessarily arbitrary, the indicators were selected on the basis that they provide an unambiguous reading 
of the stance of policy. The composite fiscal policy index, denoted by cf, is constructed as follows (see 
Appendix Table 5): 
cf  = 0.40 ρg + 0.40 Percentile{ag -bg} - 0.20 ρπ ,                                                                    
where ρg  is the (HP) correlation between the cyclical components of real GDP and central government 
expenditure, ag is the average growth in central government expenditure when GDP is above the median, 
bg is the average growth in central government expenditure when GDP is below the median (as shown in 
Table 9), and ρπ is the (HP) correlation between real GDP and the inflation tax, π/(1+π) (as shown in 
Table 9).  Thus, ag -bg provides a measure of the amplitude of the fiscal spending cycle that correlations 
do not reveal.  To normalize this measure of amplitude – so that it lies in the interval between minus one 
and one and is thus in the same units as the correlations – we distribute positive and negative observations 
into percentiles and then assign that particular percentile to the country.  For instance, as revealed by 
Appendix Table 5, Argentina has an amplitude of 5.35 percentage points (i.e., the growth rate of 
government spending is 5.35 percentage points higher in good times than in bad times).  This observation 
corresponds to the 17th percentile of all positive observations.  We thus assign Argentina the value of 
0.17.   
The first two components are given a higher weight (0.40) in the composite, as many countries in 
our sample (both developed and developing) did not rely as heavily on the inflation tax, which is assigned 
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a weight of 0.20.  Hence, since each component of the index, cf , is confined to values between one and 
minus one, so is the index, with 1 being most procyclical and -1 most countercyclical. 
  
